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WHY SPORT ILLUMINATES LAW (AND VICE VERSA)
I.

INTRODUCTION

This splendid symposium poses a straightforward two-part question: “What Can
Law Teach Sport and Sport Teach Law(yers)?”1 Professor Robert Blecker’s answer, in
short, is “a lot!”2 I think so, too. I hope, and would guess, that most attendees at the
daylong event left persuaded. But some might not have and, in any event, readers of
this issue might need some convincing. Because any two things are alike in some
respects and unalike in others, you might accept that law and sport have at least
something to teach each other while reasonably doubting that the similarities or
points of contact are sufficient to justify a more sustained or systematic comparative
inquiry. Accordingly, before starting to investigate with care what sport can teach law,
one might want to know why any such teachings are likely to be forthcoming. Without
a good answer to that question, one is entitled to be skeptical of the enterprise.
II. SPORT AND LAW AS NORMATIVE INSTITUTIONS

One route to an answer starts with another question: What is law? I’m not asking
what is the law—is it legal to turn right on red around here? Does the law require one
or two witnesses to validate a will? When did New York law first prohibit marital
rape? Does the president have constitutional power to pardon himself? These are
questions about what the law is, about what is legally prohibited, permitted, required,
and so forth. I am posing a different, more abstract question: What is law, as such?
This, too, is a familiar question that has provoked diverse answers. Thomas
Aquinas conceived of law as an ordinance of reason for the common good made by
the authority who has care of the community. 3 For John Austin, law was the
command of the sovereign.4 H.L.A. Hart proposed that law is a system characterized
by a union of primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of recognition,
adjudication, and change.5 Ronald Dworkin viewed law as the set of moral principles
that best fit and justify the institutional history of the regime.6 Each of these
accounts, and others too, has its supporters and detractors. Yet I am not alone in
finding none of the prominent extant answers entirely satisfactory. Instead, I find it
useful to try to define or conceptualize law in the classical terms of genus and
differentia: What type of thing is law, and how does it differ from other things of
that same general type?
Here is a stab at what I take to be a common view, if generally inchoate: Law is a
type of complex, institutionalized social system that deploys general rules laid down in
1.

For a transcript of the daylong symposium, see What Can Law Teach Sport and Sport Teach Law(yers)? A
Symposium on the Jurisprudence of Sport, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 119 (2018–2019) [hereinafter Symposium].

2.

See generally Robert Blecker, Penalties: Punishments, Prices, or Rewards?, 63 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 251
(2018–2019).

3.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Q. 90 (n.d.).

4.

See generally John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832).

5.

See generally H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (3d ed. 2012).

6.

See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986).
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advance to regulate a range of human behaviors for a range of ends. We could describe
this genus as that of “institutionalized normative systems.”7 Things other than legal
systems also belong to this genus, notably including religion and sport. Religions,
sports, and law make up distinct families within this genus in virtue of their differentia.8
Arguably (and to a first pass), religions are institutionalized normative systems
“founded on a belief in a superhuman order,”9 whereas sports are institutionalized
normative systems of activity designed to facilitate the development and display of
manifold human excellences, paradigmatically involving our embodied nature.10 Legal
systems (on the view I have in mind) are institutionalized normative systems established
and maintained by political communities and designed to serve a variety of goals,
characteristically including resolving disputes, preserving public order, and sustaining
the polity. Putting necessary refinements aside, institutionalized sports and legal
systems each comprise a family of systems within the same broader genus.
To the extent this sketch captures something real about our normative landscape,
sports and legal systems are close cousins. They rely extensively on the same type of
tool (chiefly, rules of various sorts) to accomplish a diversity of ends (promote aggregate
welfare, improve health and safety, facilitate the development and display of human
excellences, make things more exciting, etc.) within a diversity of constraints (without
infringing rights, at reasonable cost, without undue delay, etc.). That the rulebooks of
many European sports are titled “the Laws”11 suggests a deep affinity.12
7.

I pursue this observation in the essay, Of Law and Other Artificial Normative Systems, in Dimensions of
Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence (David Plunkett, Scott Shapiro &
Kevin Toh eds., 2019).

8.

Yes, in standard Linnaean biological taxonomy, family is a higher order taxon than genus. Taxonomy,
Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/science/taxonomy/Introduction (last visited
Sept. 12, 2018). Here, I present families as classes within the genus that I’m labeling (loosely)
“institutionalized normative systems.” The terms don’t much matter, of course.

9.

Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens 210 (2015).

10.

See Mitchell N. Berman, Sport as a Thick Cluster Concept, in Games, Sports, and Play: Philosophical
Essays (Thomas Hurka ed., forthcoming 2019).

11.

See, e.g., Laws of the Game 2018/19, Int’l Football Ass’n Board (2018), https://resources.fifa.com/
image/upload/laws-of-the-game-2018-19.pdf?cloudid=khhloe2xoigyna8juxw3; The Laws of the Game,
World Rugby (2018), https://laws.worldrugby.org/downloads/World_Rugby_Laws_2018_EN.pdf;
Laws of Cricket, Lord’s (2018), https://www.lords.org/mcc/laws-of-cricket/laws; The Official Laws of
Badminton, Badminton Ir., https://www.badmintonireland.com/file/376092/?dl=1 (last visited Sept.
14, 2018); The Laws of Tennis, Tennis & Rackets Ass’n (2012), https://www.tennisandrackets.com/
downloads/TheLawsOf Tennis.pdf.

12.

To be sure, there are differences. Law applies to persons who do not voluntarily submit to its authority,
while sports rarely do. Sports involve artificial challenges and an “escape from reality,” see J.S. Russell,
Play and the Moral Limits of Sport, in Ethics in Sport 205, 206–07 (William J. Morgan ed., 3d ed.
2018), whereas law must often grapple with, and force us to confront, aspects of reality (torture, human
trafficking, domestic abuse, and so forth) that we may prefer to ignore or pretend away. Human beings
and fruit flies (Drosophila melanogaster) are also different from each other, but that hasn’t prevented
scientists from learning plenty about us by studying them. See, e.g., Udai Bhan Pandey & Charles D.
Nichols, Human Disease Models in Drosophila Melanogaster and the Role of the Fly in Therapeutic Drug
Discovery, 63 Pharmacological Rev. 411 (2011).
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III. THREE DAYS IN JUNE

How can lawyers and law students learn from sport? Many ways, I’m sure. For
several years, I have been teaching a three-credit law school elective (first at the
University of Texas, now at the University of Pennsylvania) on just this topic, using a
set of draft materials co-authored with my friend and colleague Rich Friedman of
the University of Michigan. I have given the course different names over the years. It
began life as “The Jurisprudence of Sport;” these days it’s called “Sport and Law in
Comparative Perspective.”13 It aims to use rules, practices, and discrete incidents
from across the sporting landscape to teach general lessons about what we can
describe as the “architecture” of normative systems, or the “syntax” of normative
regulation. For instance: NFL rule changes concerning helmet-to-helmet contact
implicate timeless worries about slippery slopes and tradeoffs between rules and
standards; disputes about superstar treatment in the NBA exemplify the battle
between fairness and welfare; difficulties in aggregating judges’ scores in figure
skating illustrate Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the challenge of preference
aggregation;14 boxing’s ten-point scoring system serves as a case study in agency
costs—why they arise and how they can be ameliorated.15
I could develop any of these observations at length, but I want to be brief.
Moreover, there’s a cost to drawing on materials that are the product of countless
person-hours of curation and analysis. Doing so risks conveying the misimpression
that moments of genuine cross-domain illumination are fairly rare or require an
uncommon sensibility to discern. Neither is true. To demonstrate, I will offer three
incidents that occurred on three consecutive days in the middle of June 2018—the
very week that I sat down to write this short essay. What I hope to convey, in somewhat
13.

Rich and I welcome suggestions for a better title. Instructors may also e-mail me if they wish to review
the materials.

14.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, for which he won the 1972 Nobel Prize in Economics, The
Prize in Economics 1972, Nobel Prize (Oct. 25, 1972), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/
economics/1972/press-release, shows that there is no procedure for deriving an ordering of collective
preferences from the preference rankings of individuals who make up the collective that satisfies four
constraints that one would reasonably want an aggregation procedure to satisfy. See Kenneth J. Arrow, A
Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. Pol. Econ. 328 (1950).

15.

While the first three examples should be clear even without greater detail, the relationship between
agency costs and boxing scoring will elude many readers. Here’s the idea: Under the 10-point “must”
system, and subject to two caveats, a judge must award 10 points to the boxer she believes had the
stronger round, and a lesser number to the boxer who had the less strong round. The caveats are that a
round can be scored a 10-10 draw, and that any mandated point reductions (e.g., for knockdowns or
infractions such as low blows) can lower a round winner’s score below 10. Yet, strikingly, unless a round
includes a knockdown, it is “almost always scored 10-9,” making “boxing scoring . . . effectively binary.”
Herbert K. H. Lee, Daniel L. Cork & David J. Algranati, Did Lennox Lewis Beat Evander Holyfield?:
Methods for Analysing Small Sample Interrater Agreement Problems, 51 J. Royal Stat. Soc’y. Series D.
(The Statistician) 129, 132–34 (2002). But by collapsing the difference between a highly dominant
round and a squeaker, this practice seems poorly designed to reliably identify the boxer who had the
better fight. It’s worth wondering, then, why judges use only a tiny stretch of the scoring range. The
“agency cost” hypothesis is that the status quo continues because it serves the interests of judges even if
it doesn’t best serve the interests of the sport as a whole, or of persons who might plausibly be considered
the sport’s “principals”—fighters, promoters, and fans. See id. at 129–46.
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scattershot and impressionistic fashion, is that one need not look very far, or labor
terribly hard, for episodes that are rife with significance and possibility. You can do
jurisprudence of sport at home—you need only pick up the morning newspaper.16
A. Phil Mickelson and the Two-Stroke Penalty (or Price?)

The first incident arose during the U.S. Open, the second of the four major
annual tournaments in professional men’s golf.17 On the third day, Phil Mickelson,18
frustrated by the challenging course, ran down and tapped his still-moving bogey
putt on the 13th green before it could roll down a downward slope.19 He would
explain after the round that it was a tactical decision: He figured the two-stroke
penalty for hitting a moving ball would still leave him with a better score than if he
had allowed the ball to roll off the green.20 Reactions varied. Many observers quickly
condemned Mickelson for cheating.21 Some acknowledged that he “broke a rule,” but
denied that his violation amounted to cheating.22 At least one commentator concluded
that Mickelson’s action was “technically legal,” but possibly “outside the spirit of the
rules.”23 And a few thought that Mickelson had simply used the rules to his advantage,
and that there’s nothing more to say.24
16.

A newspaper is a periodical containing information about current events, produced on a regular and
frequent schedule, traditionally published on special paper called newsprint, and typically available to
subscribers by home delivery. See Newspaper, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.
com/topic/newspaper (last updated July 9, 2018). Newspapers were very popular through the end of the
twentieth century. See id.

17.

The other three major men’s golf tournaments are The Open Championship, The Masters, and the
USPGA Championship. Major Competitions, Int’l Golf Fed’n, https://www.igfgolf.org/about-golf/
major-competitions (last visited Dec. 25, 2018).

18.

Phil Mickelson, a professional golfer with thirty-eight PGA Tour wins and five major tournament wins,
was inducted into the World Golf Hall of Fame in 2012. Phil Mickelson, World Golf Hall of Fame,
http://www.worldgolfhalloffame.org/phil-mickelson/?tab=achievements (last visited Sep. 14, 2018).

19.

How Weird Was That? An Inside-the-Ropes Account of the Mickelson Ruling that Rocked Shinnecock, Golf.
com (June 16, 2018), https://www.golf.com/tour-news/2018/06/16/2018-us-open-phil-mickelsonround-3.

20. In Mickelson’s words: “I knew the ball was going to go off in a bad spot . . . I will gladly take the two-

shot penalty and move on . . . I’ve had multiple times where I’ve wanted to do that. I just finally did . . .
I think knowing the rules is never a bad thing. I mean, you want to always use them in your favor.” Id.

21.

See, e.g., Ian O’Connor, Why Phil Mickelson Should Apologize, Then Withdraw from the U.S. Open, ESPN
(June 16, 2018), http://www.espn.com/golf/story/_/id/23815139/phil-mickelson-withdraw-us-openbizarre-display-13th-hole-shinnecock-hills.

22.

See Gary D’Amato, Give Phil Mickelson the Benefit of the Doubt; He’s No Cheater, USA Today (June 16,
2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/golf/2018/06/16/us-open-give-phil-mickelson-benefitdoubt-hes-no-cheater/708124002.

23.

Karen Crouse, Brooks Koepka, Looking for a U.S. Open Repeat, Grabs a Share of the Lead, N.Y. Times
(June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/sports/us-open-brooks-koepka.html.

24.

See 2018 US Open: Did Phil Mickelson Cheat or Just Use the Rules of Golf to His Advantage?, Andy’s Golf &
Travel Diary (June 16, 2018), http://www.andygolftraveldiary.com/2018-us-open-did-phil-mickelsoncheat-or-just-use-the-rules-of-golf-to-his-advantage (collecting reactions to the Mickelson incident).
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Which was it—legal or illegal? Cheating or not cheating? Consistent or
inconsistent with the game’s “spirit”? Rule 1-2 of the USGA Rulebook provides that
“[a] player must not (i) take an action with the intent to influence the movement of a
ball in play.”25 Rule 14-5 provides that “[a] player must not make a stroke at his ball
while it is moving.”26 Both rules appear to strictly prohibit the move; that’s what
“must not” means. If we take him at his word, 27 Mickelson seems to have acted as the
proverbial Holmesian “bad man.”28 Instead of internalizing the normative character
of the rules, he treated a prohibition backed by a sanction as though it were a
permission made available for a price. 29 Is that okay? Do participants have an
obligation to treat prohibitions as prohibitions? If so, under what circumstances? And
what type of obligation is this—a moral obligation or (only) a golfing obligation?
Furthermore, what penalty should the USGA have imposed? Rules 1-2 and 14-5
both provide that the penalty for breach is two strokes. But 1-2 also provides that a
player may be disqualified “in the case of a serious breach.”30 Given the strict rulefollowing ethos that golf prides itself on, a purposeful and premeditated violation of
a rule designed to reduce the difficulty that tournament organizers tried to achieve
through the condition of the greens and the location of pins might seem to be “a
serious breach,” if anything is. But USGA officials held that Rule 1-2 did not apply,
and that because Mickelson “didn’t purposely deflect or stop the ball,” but “actually
made a stroke,” they “ha[d] to apply” Rule 14-5 and could not apply Rule 1-2.31 Is
this right? What method of statutory interpretation directs this conclusion—
textualism, purposivism, or something else? And what if Rule 1-2 did (also) apply?
That rule specifies that “[a] player is deemed to have committed a serious breach if
the Committee considers that the action taken in breach of this Rule has allowed
him or another player to gain a significant advantage.”32 As it happened, Mickelson’s
stroke on the moving ball did not hole it,33 leaving uncertain whether his intentional
violation ended up advantaging him at all after the two-stroke penalty was assessed.
25.

Rule 1-2, U.S. Golf Ass’n, http://www.usga.org/content/usga/home-page/rules/rules-and-decisions.
html#!rule-01 (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).

26. Rule 14-5, U.S. Golf Ass’n, http://www.usga.org/content/usga/home-page/rules/rules-and-decisions.

html#!rule-14 (last visited Aug. 30, 2018).

27.

But see infra note 59.

28. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 459 (1897) (“If you want to

know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material
consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for
conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).

29. See Blecker, supra note 2.
30. Rule 1-2, supra note 25.
31.

Phil Mickelson Sorry for Actions at US Open at Shinnecock Hills, Sky Sports (June 20, 2018), http://www.
skysports.com/golf/news/12176/11411195/phil-mickelson-sorry-for-actions-at-us-open-at-shinnecockhills.

32.

Rule 1-2, supra note 25.

33.

See D’Amato, supra note 22.
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Does this mean that his breach did not allow him “a significant advantage”? And is
disqualification authorized under 1-2 only if the breach has secured him a “significant
advantage”? That is, should “if ” be read as “if and only if ”? What principles of
statutory interpretation resolve that question?
B. Caster Semenya and the Problem of Eligibility Classifications

The second episode has roots stretching back a decade or more, but reemerged,
as it periodically does, the day after the U.S. Open concluded. In 2008, a young
South African runner, Caster Semenya, burst on the international athletics scene,
winning gold in the women’s 800-meter at the Commonwealth Youth Games in
Pune, India.34 But Semenya didn’t look like most of her fellow competitors—a New
Yorker profile would later describe her as “breathtakingly butch,” with a torso “like
the chest plate on a suit of armor . . . and a build that slides straight from her ribs to
her hips.”35 Suspicions were immediately voiced that she was an intersex athlete.36
“Intersex” is a broad term for a range of distinct conditions, also termed “differences
of sexual development,” involving the presence of intermediate or atypical
combinations of physical features or hormonal characteristics usually relied upon to
distinguish males from females.37 For purposes of elite sports, the most important
intersex conditions (important because of their relative frequency and the pressure
they place on sex classification) involve athletes who are genetically male, with XY
chromosomes and testes rather than ovaries, who do not develop external male
genitalia in utero, and who therefore present as female at birth and are raised as
girls.38 At puberty, however, their undescended testes produce levels of testosterone
in the male-typical range, conferring corresponding male-typical biomechanical
advantages such as lean body mass and higher levels of oxygen-carrying hemoglobin.39
Given her masculine appearance and remarkable performances, track and field’s
world governing body, the International Association of Athletics Federations
(I.A.A.F.) would soon subject Semenya to “sex testing.”40 And although it would
34. See Caster Semenya a New Star in 800m, Time-to-Run Global News (Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.

time-to-run.com/gn/news/semenya-new-800m-star.

35.

Ariel Levy, Either/Or: Sports, Sex, and the Case of Caster Semenya, New Yorker (Nov. 30, 2009), https://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/11/30/eitheror.

36. See id.
37.

See generally Veronica Gomez-Lobo et al., Disorders of Sexual Development in Adult Women, 128
Obstetrics & Gynecology 1162 (2016).

38. See Jessica L. Adair, In a League of Their Own: The Case for Intersex Athletes, 18 Sports Law. J. 121,

125–26 (2011).

39.

Id.

40. Jeré Longman, Understanding the Controversy over Caster Semenya, N.Y. Times (Aug. 18, 2016), https://

www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/sports/caster-semenya-800-meters.html. What the sex-testing
amounted to is something of a mystery. An athlete whose sex is in doubt (on bases that are not specified)
is subjected to a medical evaluation before a panel consisting of varied experts (including in gynecology,
endocrinology, psychology, and internal medicine), but the I.A.A.F. “has not come up with a single
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clear her to compete against women for the time being, it also started a process to
craft and implement new rules to govern the future participation of intersex athletes.41
After a series of twists and turns, in April 2018 the I.A.A.F. issued new eligibility
rules that required competitors who have circulating testosterone near the maletypical range to take hormone-suppression therapy to reduce their testosterone levels
to a specified threshold in order to compete as females in events in which elevated
testosterone had been shown to confer the greatest performance benefits—mostly
middle-distance running, including Semenya’s own event, the 800-meter.42 On June
18, 2018, Semenya announced that she would challenge the policy at the Swissbased Court of Arbitration for Sport.43 “I just want to run naturally, the way I was
born,” she said. “It is not fair that I am told I must change. It is not fair that people
question who I am.”44
Obviously, the I.A.A.F. policy raises fundamental questions about fairness and
equality. Some experts agreed with Semenya that it is unfair to intersex athletes. The
historian of science Alice Dreger denounced the new rule as “absurd and cruel,”
objecting that it has nothing to do with “natural hormone levels and fairness,” and is
“actually about cultural norms of sex and gender.”45 Others disagreed. Law professor
and former elite 800-meter runner Doriane Lambelet Coleman defended the rule as
based entirely on biology and not at all on cultural norms. “Advocates for intersex
athletes like to say that sex doesn’t divide neatly,” Coleman observed, “but at least for
competitive sports purposes, they are simply wrong. Sex in this context is easy to
define and the lines are clearly drawn: You either have testes and testosterone in the
male range or you don’t.”46 Accordingly, the I.A.A.F. rules reflect a “compromise”—
litmus test for sex,” and “does not define the criteria that its group of experts must use to reach their
determination.” Levy, supra note 35.
41.

See Samantha Glazer, Note and Comment: Sporting Chance: Litigating Sexism Out of the Olympic Intersex
Policy, 20 J.L. & Pol’y 545, 562–64 (2012).

42.

Jeré Longman, Track’s New Gender Rules Could Exclude Some Female Athletes, N.Y. Times (Apr. 25,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/25/sports/caster-semenya.html?module=inline. The rules
provide that an athlete who knows or suspects that she has a relevant intersex condition must advise the
I.A.A.F. of her condition, and that the I.A.A.F. may ask an athlete who does not self-identify as intersex
for blood or urine samples if suspicions are raised, either on the basis of blood or urine samples otherwise
collected for anti-doping purposes, or on any other grounds. I.A.A.F. Eligibility Regulations for the
Female Classification (Athletes with Differences of Sex Development) in Force as from 1st November 2018,
Int’l Ass’n Athletics Fed’ns (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.iaaf.org/about-iaaf/documents/rules-regu
lations#collapseregulations.

43.

Jeré Longman, Caster Semenya Will Challenge Testosterone Rule in Court, N.Y. Times (June 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/sports/caster-semenya-iaaf-lawsuit.html.

44. Id.
45.

Alice Dreger, Track’s Absurd New Rules for Women, N.Y. Times (Apr. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/04/27/opinion/caster-semenya-intersex-athletes.html.

46. Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Sex, Sport, and Why Track and Field’s New Rules on Intersex Athletes Are

Essential, N.Y. Times (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/30/sports/track-genderrules.html.
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intersex athletes may compete as women, but must suppress their hormones—which
“offers fairness both to the affected athletes and to the field.”47 Who’s right?
Whatever your answer to this question, notice that the challenge of assigning
intersex athletes only arises against a background in which a sport has chosen to sexsegregate or sex-classify. If the I.A.A.F. operated all its events as “open” regardless of
sex or gender, then we would never have to worry about the testosterone levels of
intersex athletes and whether they should be designated to compete as this or that.
So what justifies sex-classification sports in the first place?48
One common suggestion is that separate male and female categories are
themselves required by fairness. Due to no fault of their own, female athletes have no
chance to beat men in elite competitions in sports that significantly reward physical
strength, speed, or explosiveness.49 But because elite female athletes train just as hard
as their male counterparts to maximize their natural potential, it is only fair that
they be given a comparable chance to succeed.50 Maybe. If so, how broadly does the
argument apply? That those favored by the genetic lottery achieve greater success in
sports than do those who are less naturally gifted is as true within the sexes as across
them. Do men who lack the genetic gifts enjoyed by elite male athletes (think Steve
Rogers, of Captain America fame) have strong fairness-based claims that the
organizers of athletic competitions should make special arrangements to ensure that
they enjoy a real chance to win? Or consider race. Many experts in the relevant fields
believe that genetic differences across racial groups are sufficient to produce
significant differences in athletic performance at elite levels.51 For example, persons
of West African descent are thought to have larger muscles and more fast-twitch
47.

Id.

48. I’m not asking whether single-sex sports teams and competitions can be justified as a matter of American

law. Federal regulations under Title IX specifically authorize single-sex teams in secondary and postsecondary education. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2018). But state-operated schools are governed not only
by statute, but by the U.S. Constitution, and under binding Equal Protection doctrine crafted by the
U.S. Supreme Court, classifications on the basis of sex are supposed to be invalidated unless substantially
related to an important governmental interest. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996). It
is not obvious to me that the classification by public high schools and colleges of teams and competitions
on the basis of sex or gender has the requisite close relationship to advancing an important interest, for
there are ways to allow for broad participation in sports without classifying on either of these grounds:
Sports competitions could be sorted by height, weight, or levels of functional testosterone. Reasonable
people can reasonably disagree, it seems to me, about whether state-supported men’s and women’s teams
are: (a) constitutional because supported by an “exceedingly persuasive justification,” id. at 531–34; (b)
unconstitutional for lacking such a justification; or (c) constitutional despite lacking such a justification
precisely because it is misguided to require that all sex-based classifications meet a standard of exceeding
persuasiveness in the first place. But this is not my current concern.

49. See, e.g., Robinson Meyer, We Thought Female Athletes Were Catching Up to Men, but They’re Not,

Atlantic (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/08/we-thoughtfemale-athletes-were-catching-up-to-men-but-theyre-not/260927.

50. See, e.g., Adair, supra note 38, at 130.
51.

See, e.g., Jon Entine, Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why We’re Afraid
to Talk About It (2000).
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fibers that confer advantages in short-distance foot races, whereas Caucasians have
longer torsos that are beneficial for swimming.52
All this is controversial, but surely not crazy.53 Suppose we become convinced that
it’s true. Would fairness require that the I.A.A.F. create separate sprinting
classifications for West Africans and others, or that the International Swimming
Federation separate Caucasian from non-Caucasian swimmers? And what about mind
sports? The international federations for both chess and bridge operate three
competition categories: an “open” category for men and women of all ages, a second
category for women, and a third for seniors.54 Does the justifiability of sex-classification
in bridge depend upon our believing that men have biological advantages over women
in that game similar to their advantages in middle-distance running? If not, are there
different and better rationales for sex-classification in sport?55 And do they bear any
implications for controversial questions outside of sports?
Consider, for instance, race-based admissions preferences in university admissions.
Majority-race applicants who are denied admissions under such a scheme often
complain that, if admissions were awarded on a race-blind basis, they would get in.56
Sometimes they’re right. Similarly, male athletes who fail to qualify for a tournament
that operates separate male and female competitions might complain that, if the
separate competitions were eliminated, the promoters would operate a single “open”
pool with more slots than either of the single-sex tracks that the open competition
replaces, and they’d get in. In some cases, at least, they, too, would be right.57 Are the
52.

See id.

53.

For a skeptical view, see John Hoberman, Darwin’s Athletes: How Sport Has Damaged Black
America and Preserved the Myth of Race (1997).

54. See FIDE Calendar 2018, World Chess Fed’n, https://www.fide.com/calendar/fide-calendar.html

(last visited Dec. 26, 2018) (providing a list of competitions that are classified by age and gender); WBF
Master Point Rules, World Bridge Fed’n, http://www.wbfmasterpoints.com/MPRules.asp (last visited
Sept. 17, 2018) (distinguishing open, women, and senior events).

55.

For an argument that the best bridge and chess players are men only because more men than women (or
more boys than girls) take up these games at an early age, thus producing a larger pool of serious players,
see Christopher F. Chabris & Mark E. Glickman, Sex Differences in Intellectual Performance: Analysis of a
Large Cohort of Competitive Chess Players, 17 Psychol. Sci. 1040 (2006). On this account, which we
might call “the larger pool hypothesis,” more top bridge and chess players are men than women for
essentially the same reason that more men over seven feet tall are Chinese than Canadian. Compare The
World Factbook: China, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.
html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019), with The World Factbook: Canada, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ca.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019). Of course, more needs be said
to tie this explanation for observed performance disparities into a justification for creating a separate
classification in which only women can compete.

56. See, e.g., Don Gonyea, Majority of White Americans Say They Believe Whites Face Discrimination, NPR

(Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/10/24/559604836/majority-of-white-americans-thinktheyre-discriminated-against.

57.

Note that, in order to comply with Title IX’s mandate that colleges afford male and female students
equal opportunities for athletic participation (in proportion to their representation in the student body),
many schools respond not (only) by adding women’s sports, but (also) by cutting men’s. See Katie
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situations analogous? If not, why not? And if so, can clear thinking about the one aid
clear thinking about the other?58
C. Red Cards at the World Cup

While Mickelson was melting down at Shinnecock Hills,59 and Semenya was
preparing a challenge in Lausanne, the 2018 FIFA World Cup was just getting
under way in Sochi, Russia. In a first-round match on June 19, Japan notched a 2-1
upset victory over Colombia, one of the pre-tournament favorites.60 Japan played
almost the entire game a man up, thanks to the dismissal of Colombian defender
Carlos Sanchez for an intentional goal-preventing handball in the contest’s third
minute, the second-fastest red card in World Cup history.61
That the first two incidents are at least potentially interesting or significant to
students of law is plain. But what’s a lawyer to learn from the Japan-Colombia match?
How does this result provide grist for the legal theorist’s mill? To see how it might,
consider a question that participants at the live symposium discussed at some length:
whether sense can be made of the practice, common to many sports, of officials
calling (some) infractions less strictly at “crunch time,” that is, near the end of close
contests.62 Although it is my impression that most competitors, officials, and fans are
comfortable with the practice, a sound justification is not immediately obvious, for
considerations sounding in equality and “the rule of law” might seem to dictate that
rules should be enforced, and penalties imposed, in just the same way regardless of
the time at which they occur. If it’s appropriate to call a fault when a tennis player
touches the baseline when serving at 0-0 in the first game of the first set, it’s also
Thomas, Colleges Cut Men’s Programs to Satisfy Title IX, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2011), https://www.
nytimes.com/2011/05/02/sports/02gender.html.
58. Here’s my own view, presented telegraphically and without argument. I think that the best argument for

preserving categories for women athletes in elite competition has less to do with fairness to the particular
elite women who will thereby directly benefit, and more to do with the importance of making vivid to
girls and young women the possibility and appeal of committed participation in athletics. I also think
that race-based admissions preferences to selective institutions of higher education serve a similar—and
compelling—public interest in ensuring that young people of all races and ethnicities see and thereby
come to believe that all professions and domains of life are reasonably open to them. This is a justification
for sex-classification in sport, which is a logical precondition for debates over how to treat female
athletes with an intersex condition. It does not entail a position regarding how intersex athletes should
be classified. On that question, I am disposed to think, with Coleman, supra note 46, that the I.A.A.F.
got this close to right, but am not fully resolved in my own mind.

59.

Although Mickelson initially suggested that his actions were tactical, he later changed his tune in
response to widespread criticism: “My anger and frustration got the best of me last weekend. I’m
embarrassed and disappointed by my actions.” Sky Sports, supra note 31.

60. Victor Mather, Japan’s World Cup Starts with a Wild Win over Colombia, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2018),

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/19/sports/world-cup/colombia-japan-live.html?mtrref=undefined&
gwh=9154925F2702D170E38115B85D4E44D0&gwt=pay.

61.

Mauricio Savarese, Colombia Remains ‘United,’ Backs Sanchez After Red Card, Associated Press (June
19, 2018), https://www.apnews.com/38bd3cf727d54de99480d65395d732b2.

62. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 153, 158.
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appropriate to call a fault for the same touch when the server is facing match point.
If referees should whistle a foul and award free throws in the first minute of a
basketball game, the very same degree of contact should call for the same free throws
in the last minute of the game.
Now, I think that rigid commitment to the principle of “temporal invariance” is
unwarranted, and that some measure of whistle-swallowing is justified.63 Putting my
argument for that conclusion aside, the important point here is only that red cards in
soccer depart from temporal invariance, though often to a far greater degree. Sanchez
intentionally handled the ball—he was penalized by ejection, and his team was
penalized by being forced to play a man down for the remaining eighty-seven minutes
of the match (subject, of course, to the possibility of additional red cards, to Colombia
or Japan).64 Had he committed the very same infraction four score and four minutes
later, Colombia would have been saddled with a mere three minutes of shorthandedness. In brief, a team can suffer radically different penalties for precisely the
same infraction depending solely on when the infraction occurs. The difference is
not subtle. As Japanese striker Shinji Okazaki candidly acknowledged, Sanchez’s
early dismissal “changed the match for us.”65 So if there is anything to temporal
invariance as an ethical principle governing sport, red cards should raise a red flag.
That’s the event and some context. What can we make of it?
First, have I characterized the situation accurately? The idea that red cards are
penalties of temporally-variant magnitude depends upon conceiving them in
functionalist terms rather than formalist ones (having “X” minutes of short-handedness
versus being short-handed for the remainder of the match). How do we determine
whether formalism or functionalism provides the right analytical framework?
Second, perhaps referees ameliorate the temporally disparate effects of red cards by
being more reluctant to issue them earlier in the match. Should referees be vested with
discretion regarding whether and how strictly to enforce the rules?66 If so, how should
that discretion be cabined? And if soccer referees do enjoy such discretion, is that
because somebody with authority gave it to them, or for other reasons? Beyond soccer,
can we say anything more general, and of possible interest to law, about how much
discretion is appropriately vested in those who enforce rules and adjudicate disputes?
63. Temporal invariance in this context refers to the act of consistently calling fouls or penalties irrespective

of the amount of time remaining in the contest. See Mitchell N. Berman, “Let ‘em Play”: A Study in the
Jurisprudence of Sport, 99 Geo. L.J. 1325 (2011) (defending some measure of temporal variance by
analogy to criminal procedure’s “harmless error” rule and to contract law’s “substantial performance”
doctrine). For a competing account that seeks to explain the practice without justifying it, see Tobias J.
Moskowitz & L. Jon Wertheim, Scorecasting: The Hidden Influences Behind How Sports
Are Played and Games Are Won 7–30 (2011).

64. See Savarese, supra note 61.
65.

Id.; see also Michael Caley, Quantifying Just How Bad Carlos Sanchez’s Handball Was for Colombia,
Athletic (June 19, 2018), https://theathletic.com/399541/2018/06/19/quantifying-just-how-badcarlos-sanchezs-handball-was-for-colombia/?redirected=1 (using statistical analysis to demonstrate how
costly Sanchez’s handball truly was for his team).

66. For a provocative discussion from baseball, see Bruce Weber, As They See ‘Em: A Fan’s Travels in

the Land of Umpires 113–14 (2009).
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Third, even if soccer refs do subtly adjust the sensitivity of the trigger for the
award of a red card, in order to mitigate the way that the formal rules offend against
the principle of temporal invariance, is there a better way to achieve that end? It is
striking how few penalty options soccer provides in comparison to many other
sports. 67 Has soccer struck the optimal balance between “lumping” (treating
superficially dissimilar phenomena alike) and “splitting” (treating superficially
similar phenomena differently),68 or should it expand its menu of possibilities? For
example, should it introduce an intermediate penalty between caution and dismissal
that would require the offender to sit for some time in a penalty box (or “sin bin”),
but not for the remainder of the match, as is deployed in sports including ice hockey,
rugby, roller derby, and team handball?69 Or should a team be allowed to substitute
for a dismissed player after some specified period of short-handedness? What would
a regulator have to know in order to establish an optimal scheme of sanctions?
Fourth, and more fundamentally, why should the team suffer a period of shorthandedness at all? Player ejections in any sport almost always impose a cost on the
team as well as on the player himself: Even if the team can replace the ejected player,
the substitute is usually less good. But to dismiss a player without permitting the team
to substitute imposes a much greater cost on the team. It is a notably severe collective
punishment, a form of sanction that is generally disfavored or strictly prohibited in
domestic and international law.70 Are collective punishments always permissible in
team sports? If so, why? And if not, when should they be used and when should they
be avoided? When, if at all, should they be permitted outside of sports?
IV. CONCLUSION

Law illuminates sport and sport illuminates law. They shed light on each other
because they are kindred artificial systems of practical normativity: systems and
institutions that have social origins and serve both to create new practices and
possibilities, and to enable or incentivize, impede or discourage, favored or disfavored
forms of human behavior. To be sure, sports and municipal law standardly concern
themselves with different types of behavior, pursue sometimes disparate aims, and
67.

Fouls and other infractions in soccer can call forth one of only five different penalties: a direct or indirect
free kick, a penalty kick, a caution (yellow card), and dismissal-without-right-of-substitution (red card).
See Law 12, Int’l Football Ass’n Board, http://static-3eb8.k xcdn.com/documents/
722/144644_310518_LotG_18_19_EN_12.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2018). American football, by
contrast, allows for over two dozen distinct penalties: losses of five, ten, or fifteen yards, with and without
loss of a down; spot penalty; loss of half the distance to the goal; loss of ball; disqualification; safety;
touchdown; and more. See generally NFL, 2018 Official Playing Rules of the National Football
League (2018), https://operations.nfl.com/media/3277/2018-nfl-rulebook_final-version.pdf.

68. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as

Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 471 (2004).

69. See Aaron West, Soccer’s Lawmaking Body Looking at Bringing the ‘Sin-Bin’ to Soccer, Fox Sports (Feb. 1,

2017), https://www.foxsports.com/soccer/story/soccer-sin-bin-ifab-rule-change-possibility-yellowcards-020117.

70. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 33, Aug.

12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (“Collective penalties . . . are prohibited.”).
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face divergent stakes. But their tools and modes of operation (how the tools are made
and deployed) are often remarkably similar. The similarities might matter at least as
much as the differences insofar as we, as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars, are
interested in the tools themselves and the ways that participants in normative
domains interact with them—what various norms and normative arrangements can
and cannot do, how they can be deployed more or less effectively, and so on. If we
broaden our gaze from law, or from sports, to the larger class of normative systems
that encompasses them both, we will encounter puzzles and problems that engage
the mind and repay reflection, day after day, game after game.
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